Trademarks-Unfair Competition-Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act by Edwards, Harry T.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 6 
1964 
Trademarks-Unfair Competition-Scope of Federal Jurisdiction 
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
Harry T. Edwards 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Harry T. Edwards, Trademarks-Unfair Competition-Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under Section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1094 (1964). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol62/iss6/17 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1094 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
TRADEMARKS-UNFAIR CoMPETITION-ScoPE OF FEDERAL JURISDIC· 
TION UNDER SECTION 43(a) OF THE LANHAM Acr-Plaintiff, a manufacturer 
and distributor of engine bearings and connecting rods for internal com-
bustion engines, brought suit in a federal district court to enjoin the 
defendant from marketing and distributing the latter's products in con-
tainers which closely resembled those of the plaintiff, thereby falsely 
representing that the goods were produced by and originated with the 
plaintiff. The cause of action was based solely on section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.1 In dismissing the complaint,2 the district court ruled that 
any attempt to characterize the complaint as charging a "false description 
or representation" was without merit, and that "false designation of origin," 
as referred to in the act, is limited to geographic origin and does not 
encompass "origin by manufacturer.''3 On appeal from the order dismissing 
the complaint, held, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
Section 43(a) creates a federal right of action against particular kinds of 
unfair competition in interstate commerce. Since the complaint charges 
false description and misrepresentation, as well as false designation of 
manufacturer, it states a cause of action within the original jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 
405 (6th Cir. 1963). 
The stated purpose of the Lanham Act is to make actionable the 
deceptive and misleading use of "marks" in interstate commerce.4 Section 
43(a) of the act gives a plaintiff the right to bring a civil action against any 
person entering into commerce goods or services which bear false descrip-
tions, representations, or designations of origin.5 The usual limitations of 
jurisdictional amount and diversity of citizenship are not applicable.6 
Prior to the passage of the Lanham Act the federal courts ordinarily 
were unwilling to assume jurisdiction of cases of unfair competition unless 
1 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1958): "Any person who shall affix, apply, 
or annex, or use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or containers 
for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, in-
cluding words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and 
shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce ..• shall be liable to a civil 
action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or 
in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is 
or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.'' 
2 Federal-Mognl-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 201 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1962). 
3 In dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the district court 
reasoned that "the remedy for a false designation of origin is a civil action which may be 
brought by any person doing business in the locality falsely designated. If this were 
applied to the facts, not only might this plaintiff bring the action, but any person 
doing business near one of the plaintiff's plants could file suit • . • • Such a construction 
would open nearly all the field of unfair competition to federal jurisdiction.'' Id. at 789. 
4 60 Stat. 443 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV, 1963). The act defines 
"mark" as meaning any trademark, whether registered or not. "Trademark" includes any 
word, name, symbol, or device used to identify goods and distinguish them from those 
manufactured or sold by others. Ibid. 
5 See note 1 supra. 
6 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1958). 
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the plaintiff could prove that the defendant had been guilty of "passing off" 
his goods as those of the plaintiff.7 In effect, no relief was given unless some 
property right of the plaintiff, such as a registered trademark, was actually 
invaded.8 Although the federal courts did give relief in some cases,9 the 
disadvantage in not having a federal law of unfair competition was that a 
plaintiff bringing suit in a federal court was bound by the substantive law 
of the forum state.10 This meant that different jurisdictions might afford 
different remedies, and generally a majority of states limited recovery to 
those cases where "passing off" could be proved. 
An attempt was made to enact a federal law of unfair competition when 
section 3 of the Trade Mark Act of 192011 was passed. However, this pro-
vision was rarely used because it failed to give a remedy for false descrip-
tions and representations,12 and the plaintiff had the burden of proving that 
a false designation of origin occurred wilHully and with an intent to 
deceive.18 The few times when section 3 was made the basis of a complaint 
in a federal court, the reference to "false designation of origin" in the act 
was never read to mean "origin of manufacture,"14 as has been suggested 
by the holding in the principal case.15 
Occasionally it has been argued that section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act16 was intended to create a federal law of unfair com-
petition.17 Section 5 proscribes "unfair methods of competition in com-
7 See .American Washboard v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (6th Cir. 1900). Occa-
sional exceptions to this rule were made by the courts where there was a false designa-
tion of geographic origin and the plaintiff was an association of producers in a particular 
geographic location. Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127 
F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944); City of Carlsbad v. Tibbetts, 
51 Fed. 852 (Mass. 1892). Exceptions were also made where the plaintiff had a monopoly. 
Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 
273 U.S. 132 (1927). 
8 See generally Weil, Protectibility of Trademark Yalues Against False Competitive 
Advertising, 44 CAI.IF. L. REv. 527 (1956). 
9 See note 7 supra. 
10 See, e.g., Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666, 666-67 (1942). 
11 41 Stat. 534 (1920). 
12 Section 3 of the 1920 act was the forerunner of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. It was 
directed at any person who "willfully and with intent to deceive •• .'' affixed on "articles 
of merchandise • • • a false designation of origin • • • tending to falsely identify the 
origin of the merchandise • • • .'' A suit for damages could be brought by "any person, 
firm or corporation doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin, or 
in the region in which said locality is situated, or at the suit of any association of 
persons, firms or corporations." 41 Stat. 534 (1920). 
13 For a general discussion of the Trade Mark Act of 1920, see Derenberg, Federal 
Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of the Lanham Act, in TRADE· 
MARKS IN AcrION 14, 20 (1957). 
14 See, e.g., Parfumerie Roger et Gallet Societe Anonyme v. Godet, Inc., 17 T.M.R. I 
(S.D.N.Y. 1926). 
15 Principal case at 408. 
16 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 Stat. Ill (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958). 
17 See, e.g., Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. REv. 987 
(1949). Bunn argues that there is nothing in the Federal Trade Commission Act which 
indicates that the FTC has sole jurisdiction of unfair competition cases, and that section 
5 has never been fully utilized because no one has ever realized its potential. Id. at 998. 
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merce," and it has been suggested that the Federal Trade Commission has 
exclusive standing to bring actions against violators.18 Although section 5 
seems specifically to cover cases involving false descriptions of goods, its 
effectiveness has been limited by the rule precluding private litigation, the 
requirement that the suit be in the public interest,19 and the limited relief 
provided by cease-and-desist orders.20 It is not unreasonable to assume, 
however, that Congress, in passing section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 
intended to extend the federal law of unfair competition to cases not 
covered by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
Whether section 43(a) of the Lanham Act fashions a federal law of 
unfair competition has been the subject of much dispute in the past 
seventeen years. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the question and 
the courts of appeals21 are in complete disagreement. In the leading case of 
L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc.,22 the Third Circuit took the view 
that section 43(a) creates a new federal statutory tort which is not to be 
limited by the common-law doctrines of unfair competition.23 The L' A iglon 
opinion represented the first "broad" construction given to 43(a) by a court 
of appeals; it completely repudiated the "narrow" view expressed by the 
Ninth Circuit in Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp.24 In Chamberlain 
18 Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 221 (D. Mass. 1949) 
(dictum). 
19 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 Stat. 112 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958); see 
FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929). 
20 For writings critical of the limitations of § 5 in unfair competition cases, see 
Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HAR.v. L. REv. 814, 894-95 (1955); Comment, 70 
YALE L.J. 406, 425 (1961). 
21 Compare L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954), 
and Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), afj'd sub nom. S. C. Johnson, 
Inc. v. Gold Seal Inc., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956), with 
Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951), and Samson Crane 
Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), afj'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 
896 (1st Cir. 1950). 
22 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954); accord, Turner Hall Corp. v. Stylors Inc., 207 F. Supp. 
865 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Royal-Pioneer Paper Box Mfg. Co., 197 F. 
Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1961). 
23 L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc., supra note 21, at 651. 
24 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951). Prior to the decision in the principal case, only two 
other courts of appeals had ruled directly on the question. In the District of Columbia 
Circuit it has been held that § 43(a) not only gives the federal courts broad jurisdiction 
over certain cases of unfair competition, but also that a plaintiff "need not show that 
any false description or representation was willful or intentional, need not prove actual 
diversion of trade (passing off), and need not establish a veritable monopoly position in 
the industry." Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), afj'd sub nom. 
S.C. Johnson, Inc. v. Gold Seal Inc., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 
(1956). The First Circuit has followed the view announced in Chamberlain. Samson 
Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), afj'd per curiam, 
180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950). The Second Circuit has avoided a ruling on the question. 
Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1956); Maternally 
Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956). The district courts in the 
Second Circuit, however, have uniformly followed L'Aiglon. See, e.g., American Rolex 
Watch Corp. v. Jack Laufer & Jan Voort, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Mutation 
Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Co., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
1964] RECENT DECISIONS 1097 
it was held that "passing off" is essential to recovery under section 43(a).25 
The L' A iglon case went much further in its interpretation of 43(a). Although 
the L'Aiglon opinion did not outline the bounds of substantive relief 
available to a plaintiff, it seems safe to assume that the Third Circuit 
would hear a case brought under 43(a) where the following conditions are 
met: (1) There is a passing off. (2) A person advertises, labels, or packages 
his product in such a way that the general public is likely to be deceived, 
and the complainant's product sales and/or good will are, or are likely to 
be, damaged.26 (3) A complainant is in business in a particular geographic 
region, and that region is falsely indicated as the place of origin of the 
goods of a competitor.21 
The principal case highlights all of the basic issues in dispute, i.e., 
whether section 43(a) contains the germinal seed for a corpus of federal law 
concerning unfair competition, or whether it was intended to be a restate-
ment of the common law. In spite of the apparent confusion among the 
federal courts, it seems almost naive to argue that section 43(a) was merely 
an attempt to restate the common law existing at the time the Lanham Act 
was passed. Most writers agree that the federal courts now have original 
jurisdiction over a new federal law of unfair competition.28 As the L'Aiglon 
case would suggest, a literal reading of the act29 makes it difficult to believe 
that Congress intended simply to codify the "passing off" doctrine. In 
addition, the legislative history30 of the act seems to make it clear that 
43(a) "presents a Federal question for determination by the Federal Courts 
on the basis of the Federal law."31 
The principal case is a perplexing decision in an already confused area 
of the law. On the one hand, the Sixth Circuit sustained a complaint based 
on "false description and representation" under 43(a), citing L'Aiglon.32 
In so doing, the decision seems logically to imply that the Sixth Circuit in-
tended to follow the announced "broad" interpretation given 43(a) by the 
25 186 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1951); accord, Bechik Products v. Federal Silk Mills, 135 
F. Supp. 570 (D. Md. 1955); Performed Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 124 U.S.P.Q. 
288 (N.D. Ohio 1960). 
26 In the principal case the plaintiff alleged that the acts of the defendant had caused 
damage to its business, reputation, and good will. Principal case at 407. 
27 For an interesting general discussion of the limitations of a cause of action under 
§ 43(a) see the reasoning of the court in Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 
1955). See also Weil, supra note 8, at 536. 
28 See l CALLMAN, UNFAIR. COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 18.2(b) (Supp. 1947); 
VANDENBURGH, TRADE-MARK LAw AND PROCEDURE§ 11.30 (1959); Bunn, supra note 17, at 999. 
29 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1958). See note 33 infra. 
30 "Trade is no longer local, but is national. Marks used in interstate commerce are 
properly the subject of Federal regulation ••.. There is no essential difference between 
trade-marks infringement and what is loosely called unfair competition •••• To protect 
trademarks ••• is to protect the public from deceit, [and] to foster fair competition ...• 
This is the end to which this bill is directed." S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 
(1946). 
31 ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE MARK MANUAL 186 (1946). 
32 Principal case at 408. 
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Third Circuit.88 However, in a later part of the opinion, Samson Crane Co. v. 
Union Nat'l Sales, Inc.84 was cited to support the proposition that 43(a) 
should be "construed to refer not to any competitive practice which in the 
broad meaning of the words might be called unfair, but to that 'unfair com-
petition' which has been closely associated with the misuse of trademarks, 
i.e., the passing off of one's own goods as those of a competitor."85 The 
adoption of this quotation from Samson Crane makes it unclear whether 
the Sixth Circuit followed L'Aiglon and the view that 43(a) creates a new 
federal law of unfair competition, or whether the court simply felt that, on 
the facts of the case, there was a legitimate case of "passing off." 
The alternative holding86 in the principal case was that "the word, 
'origin,' in the Act does not merely refer to geographical origin, but also 
to origin of source or manufacture."87 Unfortunately, it appears that the 
issue was given only a superficial treatment by the court, because a literal 
interpretation of the statute shows that "origin" was intended to mean only 
geographic origin. The problem is that the decision failed to recognize that 
43(a) creates two separate causes of action and a different remedy for each 
of the actions. First, the statute proscribes "false designation of origin," and 
for such an offense a defendant may be liable to any "person doing busi-
ness in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in 
which said locality is situated .... "38 Second, the statute proscribes any 
"false description or representation," and a violator may be liable to "any 
person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged .... "39 If, in the 
first part of the statute, "origin" is read to mean not only geographic origin, 
but also source of manufacture, as the principal case holds,40 then any 
person doing business in the region or locality of the manufacturer who 
is falsely designated would be entitled to bring suit under 43(a).41 The 
unlikelihood that any person doing business in the locality, other than a 
competitor, could prove actual damage casts serious doubt on the soundness 
of this interpretation. Such uncertainty approaches conviction of error 
33 " 'Palming off,' narrowly conceived, was said to be essential to any recovery and 
the view has been expressed judicially that some such limitation is to be read into 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act •••• However, we reject this entire approach to the 
statute. We find nothing in the legislative history of the Lanham Act to justify the view 
that this section is merely declarative of existing law." L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, 
Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954). 
84 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), afj'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950). 
85 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 1949). 
36 In dismissing the principal case, the district court addressed itself primarily to the 
meaning of the word "origin" in § 43(a). 201 F. Supp. 788, 789 (N.D. Ohio 1962). While 
it is difficult to tell whether the definition of "origin" announced by the Sixth Circuit 
was intended to be only dictum, it must be given heavy weight in reading the opinion 
because the district court dismissed the case on the basis of its definition of origin, and 
the plaintiff's complaint alleged a false designation of origin. 
37 Principal case at 408. 
88 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1958). (Emphasis added.) 
89 Ibid. 
40 Principal case at 408. 
41 See note 3 supra. 
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when it is noted that the word "origin" is qualified by the words "locality" 
and "region," both of which are geographic references. 
It is difficult to ascertain just where the Sixth Circuit stands. A strong 
argument can be made that the principal case stands for the limited 
proposition that packaging techniques alone are capable of being ad-
judged a "misrepresentation" that the goods of one are in fact the goods 
of another. This in itself would have been a sufficient ground for reversal.42 
And although the court does not, when dealing with the "false description 
and representation" aspect of 43(a), explicitly state that "passing off" need 
not be proved, it does so implicitly by citing L' A iglon and American Rolex.48 
However, it would be dangerous to rely on that part of the decision which 
interprets "origin" as "source of manufacture." This alternative holding is 
supported by a quotation from Samson Crane, which is contrary to the 
reasoning of L'Aiglon; it requires a strained statutory construction and is 
unnecessary in light of the broad interpretation of "false description and 
representation." 
Harry T. Edwards 
42 The district court held that the allegations were not sufficient to state a cause of 
action for false description or representation. 201 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1962). 
48 176 F. Supp. 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). 
